About : standard furniture dimension
Title : standard furniture dimension
standard furniture dimension
[ music ] [ silence ] >> good afternoon. just a word about nist. for over a century,nist's mission has been to advance measurement, science,standards, and technology for the benefit ofthe american people. within nist, the building andfire research programs strive to anticipate and meet themeasurement, science, standards,
and technology needsof the building and fire safety communities. my colleagues from nistand i are here today to provide a briefingand announce the release of a draft report ofour technical study of the sofa super store fire. the fire occurred in charlestonon the evening of june 18, 2007, and resulted in the deaths of nine firefightersfrom your community.
our study focused on determiningthe likely technical causes of the rapid fire growth thatcontributed to the high number of firefighter casualtiesin this fire. based on the findingsin the study, we are recommendingspecific improvements to model building standards,codes, and practices. while nist has noregulatory authority and can't require thechanges, we are committed to, and will work diligentlywith standards bodies,
model code bodies, andprofessional societies to encourage the adoptionof our recommendations. we will also work fortheir adoption by state and local agencies thathave the ultimate authority to implement the changesfor the safety and benefit of the american people. we know this community hassuffered a terrible tragedy. we trust our work will bean important step to avoid such tragedies in othercommunities across the country.
we are releasingthe draft report for a 30-day publiccomment period. we encourage all to review ourreport and give us comments that could make ourrecommendations as effective as possible. nelson bryner, who led thestudy and is the deputy chief of our fire research division,will now give you a summary of our study andits recommendations. >> nelson bryner:thank you, bill.
good afternoon. as bill has just mentioned, nist is a scientificresearch organization. we chose to study thecharleston sofa super store fire because it was clearly anunusual and tragic event. we hope to learn new informationabout, new information that would be helpfulto firefighters and the public in the future. today, i'd like tosummarize what we found
about how the sofa superstore fire spread and grew; what conditions,such as temperatures, oxygen concentrations,and smoke movement, occurred within thestructure during the fire; what model fire codes,standards, and practices we recommendbe changed as a result of what we've learnedduring our study. it's also important tonote, it's also important to know what we did notstudy during this effort.
we recognize that manyin the community would like to know preciselyhow the nine firefighters who lost their lives inthis fire became trapped and were unable to escape. many would like to knowwhether specific decisions made by individuals ororganizations before, during, or after the fire werethe right decisions. our study was focused onour specific expertise-- fire science-- and wecannot tell you based
on our findings how or why thefirefighters became trapped. we also cannot tell you whetherthe decisions made before, during, or after thefire were right or wrong. what we can tell you,with reasonable accuracy, is the probable technical causefor the fire's rapid spread and what actions can be taken tohopefully prevent loss of life from a similar typeof fire in the future. we conducted our studyin the following way: we arrived at charleston36 hours after the fire
and began collecting asmuch data as possible about the store, its contentson the day of the fire, the fire event itself;we gathered records about the building; wegathered video and photographs of the store before,during, and after the fire; radio transmissions from firstresponders during the fire; we conducted informaldiscussions with store employees,interviews with firefighters, and reviewed other publicmaterial describing the event.
then we took all the datawe had collected and used it to generate a timeline ofevents and to simulate, with a computer modeldeveloped at nist, the most probable sequence offire behavior that matched well with the visual andother records available about what had actuallyhappened. with this computer modelingsoftware, we can input data about many characteristics of aspecific fire, and then model-- the model uses a set ofrules based on what we know
about the physics of fireto simulate the changes in temperature, oxygen levels,smoke, and other variables. in your handout, on pagefive, you have the key events in the overall timelinethat we constructed. it begins with the firebeing observed at the rear of the store at 6:56 pm andcontinues to the collapse of the roof over the westportion of the main showroom at 7:51, and finally, tothe fire being brought under control at 10 pm.
with this timeline ofthe actual fire in place, we then created simulationsof the fire behavior within the sofa super store. first, we established whatwe call the fuel load-- the type and amount of combustible materialin the building. the fuel load in some furniturestores, and especially those with large open display areaslike the sofa super store, is higher than inmost retail spaces.
we estimated the energy contentof the fuel load from our, from the foam-filledfurniture in the showroom and the loading dockareas of the store. we estimated it to beabout 610 gigajoules. for comparison, a hundredgallons of gasoline contains about 12 gigajoules of energy. we also created floorplans of the space, based on our observationsat the site, determined the materials usedto construct the various parts
of the building, and whethersprinklers were present. we established which windows anddoors were open at what times to determine the air and howthe air and the smoke flowed. we gathered weather data. a key finding of this data-gathering effort was the fact that the store did nothave automatic sprinklers. once we had described theconditions as accurately as possible, we ran severaldifferent simulations and matched them up againstthe photographs, the videos,
the radio transmissions,interviews, and other data available that described thesofa super store fire. the simulation that best matchedthe available data is the most probable fire sequence. i will show several of thesesimulations in just a minute. a technical computer simulation like this one is a science-basedset of moving images that approximates howan event occurred.
it is not identicalto the actual event, since we don't have all thedetails of the store design and its comments, orthe computing power to include everydetail about this fire or any fire in the model. it can, however, tell uswith reasonable accuracy, what temperatures were like atvarious times during the fire, how the fire moved over time,what the oxygen levels were at different times andlocations in the building,
and how much smoke was generatedby the burning furniture in the store andwhere it flowed. the simulations we created to visualize the sofa superstore fire were, by necessity, complex and time-consumingto run. each simulation required aboutfour days of computing time, and the entire study requiredmore than 250 separate runs. while the fire engulfedboth the store showrooms and the warehouse,
our simulations did notinclude the warehouse since no firefighters weretrapped in the warehouse and the fire in the warehousedid not directly affect the fire in the showrooms. in this slide, i think we needto-- somebody will-- okay. so in this slide, you see thefloor plan as it is in the model for the sofa super store. you see how the furnituresare laid out-- main showroom, eastshowroom, west showroom.
in this slide, okay,we're looking at, the temperature slice5 feet above the floor. the video is 20 times realtime, and blue temperature, blue color indicates70 degrees fahrenheit. when the colors turnto red, it's in excess of 1500 degrees fahrenheit. let me see if i canrun this now. now, you're going tosee the fire start in the loading dock area.
it's then going to spread tothe holding area into the main-- rear of the main show room. so you can now see the fireis in the loading dock area. very quickly, temperaturesexceed that 1500 degrees fahrenheit. the fire is now beginning tomove into the holding area. again, once the smokeand flames gained access to the holding area throughan open roll-up door, the holding area didnot have a drop ceiling,
and the smoke began to moveup and into the void space above the drop ceiling forthe entire main show room. at some particularpoint, the fire breaks through into the rearof the main showroom through the wall ofthe holding area. at this particular point, thefire is ventilation-limited, it does not have enough oxygento continue to spread quickly. it begins to moveforward, but then slows, and then the windows are brokenin the front of the store.
this provides additional oxygen,and the fire moves quickly to the front, the westside of the main showroom, and then to the east sideof the main showroom, and then into the west showroom. okay. let's see here. this is another simulation. this one, again,you'll be looking at it from the same perspective, it'sthe movement of smoke and flame.
these, the data is pictured5 feet five above the floor; it's running about20 times real time. again, you see the smoke in theloading dock rapidly accumulate. the smoke is now movingacross the main showroom in the void space,some smoke is making it into the west showroom. again, the back ofthe main showroom, where the heaviestdensity of smoke is at, at, the fire is ventilation-limited,it cannot grow very quickly
because it doesn'thave enough oxygen. the fire is aboutready to break through. it has broken through now intothe rear of the main showroom. it's now beginning tomove a little bit forward, but it's limited again becauseit doesn't have enough oxygen. it continues to move a littlebit, but not very quickly. and then about 24 minutesinto-- after the fire arrived, they break the windows,and again, you can see the orange flamefront move more rapidly
to the front of thestore on the west side, and then over to the eastside, and then it moves into the west show room as well. the next simulationis oxygen levels. normal ambient air hasabout 21 percent oxygen. previous research has shownthat a person without oxygen from a breathing apparatuswill have difficulty escaping if the air contains lessthan 12 percent oxygen. in these simulation runs, you'llsee the changes in colors.
blue is ambient oxygen, 21percent, that which we have now; 12 percent is that untenablethat i just described. it will be the red color. so again, you see the firestarting on the loading dock. it very quickly depletesthe oxygen in much of the loading dock there. it begins to deplete theoxygen in the holding area. it does not move much intothe rear of the west showroom. it moves into the holdingarea, and then it begins
to breach the wallbetween the holding area and into the rear ofthe main showroom. now, the holding area hasgone below 12 percent, and you can begin to see it'sdrawing down the concentration across the whole showroom. you can also see at the frontthere, a little burst of blue. that's the fresh aircoming in the front door. excuse me. again, the fire isventilation-limited at the rear,
pauses, and then whenthey break the windows, the fire moves ratherdramatically to the front of themain showroom. and you can see that at thisparticular point, the entire-- all the showrooms arenow completely untenable. based on the data that we'vecollected during the studies, and i've just shown, as well as the additionalsimulations available on the cd that is providedwith our full report,
we've reached the key findings. the sofa super store fireprogressed at a rapid rate due to several important factors. these factors include: largeopen spaces and doorways that remained open,allowing the fire to move from the loadingdock to the showroom and between the variousshowrooms; high fuel loads provided bythe foam-filled furniture; the lack of automaticsprinklers to suppress the fire
in its early stages; metalwalls that allowed the heat from the fire to move from theloading dock to the showrooms and to the warehouse and igniteitems in these adjacent spaces as well; the venting of smoke by breaking the store's frontwindows provided additional air to the fire. to examine how the use of automatic sprinklers mayhave changed the outcome of the sofa super store fire,
we also ran simulationsshowing what would have happened if sprinklers had beeninstalled on the loading dock. on the left, you see thetemperature simulation that i showed you earlier. that is the most probablefire sequence, temperature, 5 feet above the floor. using the same color scale, 70is blue, is 70 degrees f, red, is slightly over 1500degrees fahrenheit. and on the right,sprinklers have been installed
let's see if i can get both ofthese to-- so i've activated-- started both simulations. if you don't see muchactivity on the sprinkler side, that is because the sprinklersactivated at 50 seconds and at 75 seconds, andthey've controlled the fire on the loading dock. the conditions on theloading dock will remain blue for the rest of the simulation;they will remain tenable for the rest of the simulation.
again, the sprinklers activatedwithin 50 to 75 seconds, and the fire does not spreadbeyond the loading dock. [ pause ] the findings i havejust described led us to several importantrecommendations. first, furniture storesrepresent a significant fire hazard, and all states and localjurisdictions should adopt model building and fire codes that specifically address highfuel load commercial spaces.
second, to ensure that hazardousconditions, such as the lack of appropriate firedoors, fire walls, and sprinklers are identifiedand corrected, all state and local jurisdictions shouldimplement aggressive fire inspection and enforcementprograms, and ensure that inspectorsare professionally qualified to a national standard. third, all state and localauthorities should adopt and enforce model codes
that require automaticsprinkler systems for all new commercialretail furniture stores, regardless of size, and allexisting furniture stores with any single display areagreater than 2,000 square feet. we've also made severalrecommendations for additional research efforts that would furtheradvance the understanding of upholstered flame spread-- upholstered furniture flamespread, improved fire barriers,
decision aids to helpcommunities allocate their fire safety resources, ventilationof burning structures, and the performancemeasures for fire protection. when nist issues a report ofa fire study like this one, we often provide it in draftform so that the comments from the public canbe considered. we urge that all partiesreview the draft report and send us theircomments by december 2nd to fire safety@nist.gov.
directions for submittingcomments are provided on our web site at www.nist.gov. in summary, the key lessonslearned from our study are that a community's firesafety depends upon the use and enforcement of modelbuilding and fire codes that address the specifichazards and fuel loads of different types of spaces. furniture storestypically have large amounts of combustible material
and represent a significantfire hazard. as a result, model buildingcodes should require that both new and existingstores have automatic sprinklers, especially ifthose stores include large, open display areas. thank you, and at thispoint, we'd be happy to take your questions. >> i'm going to pass arounda microphone if i could ask, we can, state your nameand your organization.
>> yes, sir. it's not on? let's see. >> harve jacobs: hello, hello. anybody hear me? my name is harve jacobs. i'm with wcsc tv, the cbsaffiliate here in charleston. sir, bottom line, if there weresprinklers inside that store, we wouldn't be here today?
>> nelson bryner: the computersimulations demonstrate that the sprinklers would haveactivated in 50 to 75 seconds and would have controlledthe fire on the loading dock. the fire would not havespread to the showrooms. >> glenn smith: did-- glennsmith from the post and courier. did you do any simulationsto look at how the fire mighthave behaved if the windows had notbeen vented in the front? >> nelson bryner: yes, sir.
there were five scenariosincluded in this technical study that are describedin the report. the first one is the mostprobable fire sequence; the second one is sprinklerson the loading dock; the third is intact windows, the left front windowswere left intact; the fourth is a smallvertical vent, a roof opening; and the fifth was alarge roof opening. >> glenn smith: whatwere the findings?
the venting-- i'm sorry--the differences in venting, what were the conclusionsfrom that? >> neslon bryner: in termsof the small vertical vent on the roof, it did not appearto have a significant impact over how the firespread relative to the windows-intact case. in terms of the large verticalvent on the roof, it did appear to delay the movement ofthe fire from the rear of the main showroom for asignificant period of time.
however, the fire didcontinue to move and did emerge at the front of the store. >> other questions? >> are you sayingthat, sir, the-- are you saying the windows nevershould have been broken open during this fire? >> neslon bryner:our study focused on the fire spreadwithin the showrooms. we did not analyzetactics that were used
by the fire department. ventilation is oftenused by fire departments. the study simulationsdemonstrate that when the windowswere broken, it provided additional oxygento the fire at the rear of the show room, whichcaused it to move quickly to the front of the showroom. >> did you ever arriveat a cause of the fire, what caused the trashmaterial to ignite?
>> neslon bryner:no, we did not. again, our focuswas on the movement of the fire withinthe structure. the bureau of alcohol, tobacco,and firearms report indicated that the fire had been initiatedin a pile of trash outside. interviews with storeemployees demonstrated that when he discharged the fireextinguisher, that the fire was around the door frameat about the same-- underneath the sort of aroundthe door frame exhaust fan area
in the loading dock,which was consistent with the fire moving inside. >> chris smith: chrissmith, the ap. you had indicated that theopening the windows helped the fire spread throughthe showroom. did you-- was there any study of if they had nothave opened that, how long a time itwould have been until the showroomitself was fully involved?
>> neslon bryner: yes, and inchapter four of the report, the third case, is the frontwindows being left intact. it did-- the fire did notmove as rapidly to the front of the store, it remainedventilation-limited for a longer period of time,but it did eventually move to the front of the store. >> how much-- approximately,how much time? >> neslon bryner: i don'trecall off the top of my head. that would be in chapter four.
>> greg hambrick: greg hambrickwith the charleston city paper. can you give us a layman'sdescription of the oxygen levels in the front of the store justbefore the windows were broken out, what that oxygen-- what theoxygen levels would have been-- or not oxygen-- i'm sorry-- smoke levels, howthick the smoke was? >> neslon bryner: once the--let's go back a little bit. once the fire had reached therear of the main showroom, it had gone-- it hadbreached the wall
between the holding area andthe rear of the main showroom. at that particular point,the fire was oxygen-limited. it didn't have enough oxygen. so it was beginningto generate quantities of unburned fuel and smoke. this was collectingunderneath the drop ceiling in the main showroom. the simulation demonstratesthat at about the time that the windows wouldhave been broken out,
the smoke had reachednear the floor. photographs, video, as well asstill photos from the scene, demonstrate that when they brokethe windows, brown smoke flowed out of the windows immediately. within a minute, thecolor of the smoke turned to a much darker black color. and with a minute after that, you had flames comingout the front. >> harve jacobs: so withall due respect, sir,
if you think people aretrapped inside of that place, how do you go in after them? you break the windowsopen, that's a problem; ventilation that's a problem. what do you do? >> nelson bryner:again, we did not-- our study focused on understanding whythe fire spread quickly within the structure.
we did not, we did not analyzetactics or other considerations. >> you point out that aninspector's enforcement program should be trained tonational standards. how about fire fightersthemselves? any recommendationsalong those lines or-- >> nelson bryner: i think that-- we believe that firefighters should-- in all states, inall jurisdictions-- should be trained to thenational standards, yes.
>> you had mentioned earlier that firefighterssometimes do use ventilation to deal with a fire? why would that be? wouldn't any ventilationjust make flames bigger? >> nelson bryner: it's nota correct statement to say that any ventilation wouldmake the flames bigger. it's a function of where theventilation is accomplished and where in thefire it happened.
for example, if you look at thelarge vertical vent scenario that we did, and thatyou'll find in volume two of the report, introducing alarge vertical vent delayed the progression of the fire fromthe rear of the main showroom it did not prevent it. the fire still moved,but it delayed it. >> natalie caula: natalie caulawith abc news 4 in charleston. i understand that therenderings took quite some time for the computer simulations.
but i understandthere have been some, there have been some delays. can you explain the process of why it may have takenthis long for the report? >> nelson bryner: well, firstof all, we wanted to make sure that we were very thorough,accurate, and complete. again, each of the-- it takesa significant amount of time to get the geometry and the fuel and everything elseinto the model.
it takes 4 days to runthe model, you then need to look at-- you need tocompare the results of the model to the interview, thephotographs, the video, everything you have,and then you go back and rerun the simulationif the fire is showing up at the wrong placeat the wrong time. initially, we were veryinterested in the path that went through the rear ofthe west showroom. the assistant chief hadarrived on the scene,
and he made several trips tothe rear of the showroom area, and he didn't find anysmoke or any fire at all. so we were interested in thefire transitioning or moving through those double steel doors at the rear of thewest showroom. the simulations, we were notable to get the simulations to match that movementof the fire. we then went back and gatheredsome additional information, some discussionswith store employees,
and we gained a betterunderstanding of the geometry ofthe holding area. we had not appreciated, andthere are floor plans out there, which do not show all thewalls on the holding area. once we had a betterunderstanding of the whole of the walls around the holdingarea, we began to appreciate that the smoke from theloading dock could flow into the void spaceabove the drop ceiling, and we could then understandwhy it took a period of time
for the fire to move in therear of the main showroom. so it's a matter ofgetting it right, being accurate, andbeing complete. >> natalie caula: canyou tell us a little bit about the lack of-- you saidthat there was some lack of information and someplans that kind of hampered-- could you just talk alittle bit about that? >> nelson bryner: the firedestroyed very thoroughly, major portions ofthis structure.
it was difficult to reconstructall the geometry the first time we did it. after we had talked to thestore employees, we went back, and in the thousands ofphotographs that we had taken, we actually found additionalevidence of that wall. we also found evidence of a doorin that wall, and that helped us to understand how thefire may have moved from the holding area. without the wall,without the partition wall
in the holding area,if the fire had flowed through that open roll-up doorfrom the loading dock area, it would have flowed into therear of the main showroom, and anybody in the showroom, early in the fire,would have seen it. we had no evidence thatanybody had found smoke or flame in the rear of the mainshowroom early in the fire. and so, that was an observationthat we needed to match. >> i was going to bring-- i wasgoing to bring that up as well.
the assistant fire chief,his initial account was that he had walked tothe back of the building, opened this door, andflame leaped inside. and then talking later tomembers of the routley family, said they found that therewasn't as significant a moment as it first appeared, and thatpossibly didn't occur exactly as he said. is that what you'resaying as well, or-- >> nelson bryner:the information
that we gatheredduring interviews was that when the double-steeldoors at the rear of the west showroomwas unlatched, the door was pulledout of their hand. now, initially, youmight think, well, what conditions wouldcause that? the fire was under-ventilated. it was trying to findoxygen wherever it could. it was pulling air from theshowrooms as best as it could.
when you unlatched that door, it was able to get additionaloxygen to the loading dock area. the model demonstrates, andthere's images in chapter four, which show that the velocityprofile would have been going from the west showroominto the loading dock area. again, consistent with theinterview data that we had. okay? >> 'cause of theair sucking out... [inaudible]--
>> nelson bryner:early in the fire, the air is moving towardsthe loading dock area. >> when you come outwith the final report and make recommendations,what can your agency do to make sure they'reimplemented? >> nelson bryner: we followup with them, we serve on many of the code commissionsand standards committees, so we do followup with them tomake sure they get implemented. if additional researchis necessary to support
that implementation,then we often do that. so, there'll be asignificant amount of followup, and with previous studies,we've been very successful in getting codes revised--model codes revised now. [ inaudible remark ] >> there's a lot ofdiscussion about sprinklers and the effect theyhad on the fire. there's been also a lotof debate over the months about illegal additions thatwere supposedly built at the,
at the store, thingsthat weren't up to code. if everything had beenconstructed up to code at the store, how wouldthat have affected the fire? >> nelson bryner: ifit had been constructed to today's model code, okay, andwe work within the model code. understand that local-- stateand local jurisdictions get to adopt either all the modelcode or parts of the model code. so north carolina canchoose to take this piece, florida can chooseto take that piece.
we work with the model code. the model code wouldhave required that the main showroombe sprinklered. the model code nowsays that areas larger than 12,500 square feet in a mercantile occupancy arerequired to be sprinklered. the main showroom was inexcess of 15,000 square feet. in the '94 code, thatarea limitation was 15,000 square feet.
in the current code,high-piled rack storage of flammable merchandisesuch as furniture, is required to be sprinklered. so the showroom would havebeen-- i mean-- sorry-- the warehouse wouldhave been required under high-piled storageto be sprinklered. the simulations demonstratethat if sprinklers had been on the loading dock, thatwould have stopped the fire quite quickly.
>> how about the fire doors, if those had been functioningproperly-- i'm sorry. >> nelson bryner: okay. the question wasabout fire doors and if they had beenfunctioning properly. again, we did notdo a simulation where we did differentthings with the fire door, so i can't answer that directly. however, i will direct you toone of our recommendations,
which is to conductsome additional research as to the performanceof fire doors, and to understandhow extended service and more realistic fireconditions actually affect that performance. so that is one ofour recommendations. >> did you do anysimulation that-- you said the, the sprinklers at the loading wouldhave stopped it.
did you do any simulation of ifthey were not the loading dock, but at other places at thestore, would have stopped it? >> nelson bryner: no. the only place weinstalled the sprinklers were >> and is that-- wouldthat be usual for a company to have sprinklers on aloading dock as opposed to the interior space? >> nelson bryner:again, the current code, it depends upon howthe local authority
with jurisdiction classifies it. if it was considered to bepart of the main showroom-- there was a connectingopening there-- then the main showroomexceeded 12,500 square feet, adding an additional 2,220 feet with the loading dockwould have certainly been required sprinklers. however, one can also establisha separate fire barrier area by addressing thewalls and the doors.
so if the doors had been allupgraded to fire-rated doors of a specific time period,and the walls, the metal walls of the warehouse, as wellas the rear of the main-- of the west showroomhad been upgraded, then that space couldhave been nonsprinklered. >> quick question. i know you folks have donethe world trade center and the night clubfire in rhode island. is this the first timeyou've done a study,
like on a furniturestore fire like this? is this new territory for you? >> nelson bryner: yes. this-- we have not done, to myknowledge, furniture stores. we've done a numberof different venues, but not furniture stores. >> and was thereanything out of this that seemed more dangerousor-- can you kind of quantify? >> nelson bryner: again,it's the large open areas,
it's the high fuel loadrepresented by the foam- filled furniture, and it'sthe lack of sprinklers. >> you make recommendationsas far as building codes, but there's nothing in here-- you haven't addressedthe furniture itself and whether it shouldbe manufactured to improve standards. is that one of yourrecommendations to consider for--
>> nelson bryner: yes, thatis one of the recommendations, is to understand the firespread on upholstered furniture. >> but let me modifythat just a bit. it's to study how thefire spread over furniture to help the industryarrive at safer materials. we are not makinga recommendation in this particular studyto change the codes of standards regardingthe furniture. >> i guess the other end of myquestion, going back to the fact
that it's a furniturestore, do you think that a furniture store shouldhave even more safeguards than a mercantile establishment? >> nelson bryner: i think thatthe fuel load and the open, large open display areasrepresent a unique fire hazard. yes, i do. >> just to clarify. i know consumer protection hasbeen looking at a new standard for furniture for some time.
it's been debatedover the past couple of years, or taken commentary. you won't be enteringthat debate at this time? >> that's not connectedto this study yet.